

Probabilistic Verification of Coordinated Multi- Robot Missions

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Motivation

Robots increasingly used to perform a wide variety of tasks

- Involving dangerous or inhospitable situations
- Example: Robotic demining
 - http://www.ri.cmu.edu/research_project_detail.html?project_id=220&menu_id=261

Have to face uncertain situations

- Internal (e.g., sensor accuracy)
- External (e.g., presence of mine)

Typically operate in teams

Mission designers control number of teams, size of each team, capability of each robot, etc.

- Currently an ad-hoc process

Problem: Analytically find the mission design that optimizes (i.e., maximizes probability or expected value of) some overall system utility



Solution: Use Probabilistic Model Checking


Specifically, model checking (a restricted type of) discrete time Markov chains (DTMCs)

Widely studied over many years, well-understood theory

- For example: C. Baier. On algorithmic verification methods for probabilistic systems. Habilitation Thesis. 1998

Mature tools

- PRISM: <http://www.prismmodelchecker.org/>



Contributions of this paper

- Identifying a restricted class of probabilistic automata that naturally model coordinated multi-robot missions
- Showing that probabilities and expected rewards for these can be computed compositionally
- Empirical validation on a robotic demining example



Our Focus: Forage and Rescue (FAR) Missions

Robots explore an arena, look for objects, and react in specific ways

Example: robotic demining

- Two-dimensional array of cells
- Randomly seeded with mines
- T teams each consisting of N robots
- Cells pre-allocated to teams




Each team has one leader and zero or more followers. Teams operate independently as follows:


- Each team follows a pre-defined path to explore all cells assigned to it
- In each cell, the leader tries to detect a mine. If a mine is found, the leader tries to defuse it. If it could not be defused, the cell is marked as being mined. The team moves to the next cell in its path.
- If the leader explodes, a new leader is elected via a standard protocol



Example: Robotic Demining with 1 team



Example: Robotic Demining with 4 teams



Sources of Uncertainty

External: Due to the terrain

- The leader sometimes fails to detect a mine
- The time to defuse varies from mine to another
- Team cannot move to next cell due to locomotion issues



Internal: Due to robot capability

- Mine explodes while being defused
- Mine explodes while a cell is being marked



External: Due to communication

- Leader election algorithm fails



Properties

Property 1: Probability of *Success*, where:

Success = Every team covers all the cells allocated to it within a given deadline D without missing a single mine

Property 2: Expected value of *Coverage*, where:

Coverage = Total number of cells covered by all the teams within a given deadline D

Goal: Compute Properties 1 and 2 for various combinations of values of D, T, N and probabilities expressing the uncertainties we consider



First Cut

Model each team as a DTMC. Let model for team i be M_i

The overall mission model is the parallel composition of each team DTMC, i.e., $M = M_1 \parallel \dots \parallel M_T$

Express properties 1 and 2 using PCTL

Model check using PRISM

Does not work. Two problems:

1. **Theoretical:** DTMC not closed under parallel composition. Properties 1 and 2 don't make in the composed model.
2. **Practical:** Statespace blows up





Second Cut

Properties 1 and 2 don't make sense if we compose the team models (even partially) asynchronously

But the properties do make sense in the “real world”

Ergo, something is synchronizing the teams ... time

- The teams don't have synchronized clocks
- But they march to the tick of the same global clock
- Assuming they are not zooming at relativistic speeds



So, what happens if we just stick to DTMCs with a singleton alphabet

- αPA : each transition labeled by α , which corresponds to an unit of time
- Closed under parallel composition (theoretical problem solved)
- Compositionality results for probabilities and expected rewards (practical problem solved)



Definitions (1)

α PA. Probabilistic Automaton $M = (S, \text{Init}, \Sigma, \delta, AP, \mathcal{L})$ where

- (i) S is a set of states*
- (ii) Init = initial state*
- (iii) $\Sigma = \{\alpha\}$ = alphabet*
- (iv) δ is the transition relation that maps each state to a probability distribution over all the states*
- (v) AP = atomic propositions*
- (vi) \mathcal{L} labels states with sets of atomic propositions.*

Execution. Sequence of states following the transition relation.

Cylinder. If \hat{s} is a finite execution, then $\text{Cyl}(\hat{s})$ is the set of all its infinite extensions.



Definitions (2)

LTL. Linear temporal logic. A model is an infinite execution of an α PA defined in the standard way.

***Result.** The set of all executions of a probabilistic automaton M satisfying an LTL formula Ψ is expressible as a countable union of cylinders. The probability $P(M, \Psi)$ of M satisfying Ψ is measurable.*

***Parallel Composition. Synchronous.** Result $M_1 \parallel M_2$ is also an α PA.*

***Reward Structure.** $R = (\rho, \iota)$ where ρ maps states to rewards and ι maps transitions to rewards. For any α PA state s and reward structure R , the cumulative reward up to k steps $C_{\leq k}(s, R)$ defined in a natural way by taking the weighted (probabilities) of all rewards.*



Result 1: Compositionality of Probabilities

Theorem 2. Let M_1, \dots, M_n be α PA with disjoint atomic propositions. Let Ψ_1, \dots, Ψ_n be LTL formulas such that Ψ_i is over AP_i . Then:

$$P(M_1 \parallel \dots \parallel M_n, \Psi_1 \wedge \dots \wedge \Psi_n) = \prod_{i=1}^n P(M_i, \Psi_i)$$

Probabilities of satisfying LTL formulas are compositionally computable

- Essentially due to the “independence” of the M_i 's and Ψ_i 's

Moreover, *Success* for T teams is expressible as $\Psi_1 \wedge \dots \wedge \Psi_T$ which satisfy the conditions of *Theorem 2*



Result 2: Compositionality of Rewards

Theorem 4. Let M_1, \dots, M_n be α PA with disjoint atomic propositions. Let R_1, \dots, R_n be reward structures over M_1, \dots, M_n , respectively. Then:


$$\forall k. C_k(M_1 \parallel \dots \parallel M_n, R_1 \oplus \dots \oplus R_n) = \sum_{i=1}^n C_k(M_i, R_i)$$

Rewards are compositionally computable


Moreover, *Coverage* for T teams is expressible as $R_1 \oplus \dots \oplus R_T$ which satisfy the conditions of *Theorem 4*




Modeling a team as a αPA



Behavior within a cell : M_{cell}



Experimental Results: *Success* ($D = 250$)



T	N	$success_D$								Time seconds
		LLL	LLH	LHL	LHH	HLL	HLH	HHL	HHH	
2	2	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.013	0.014	0.035	0.035	21
2	3	0.001	0.001	0.003	0.004	0.065	0.066	0.129	0.131	26
2	5	0.018	0.018	0.030	0.031	0.256	0.259	0.355	0.359	38
2	10	0.073	0.074	0.086	0.087	0.386	0.391	0.443	0.449	62
2	15	0.076	0.077	0.087	0.089	0.386	0.391	0.443	0.449	87

Direct verification (using a model containing all the αPAs) with PRISM timed out at 1800 seconds. Compositionality results very useful in practice.

<http://www.contrib.andrew.cmu.edu/~schaki/discover/spin13.tgz>



Experimental Results: *Success* ($D = 250$)

2 teams

Varying team size

DET=Low
DEF=High
LOC=Low

DET=Detection Capability
DEF=Defusing Capability
LOC=Locomotion Capability
Influence probability distribution

Average Time

T	N	<i>success_D</i>		Time
		LLL	HLL	seconds
2	2	0.000	0.013	21
2	3	0.001	0.065	26
2	5	0.018	0.256	38
2	10	0.073	0.386	62
2	15	0.076	0.386	87

**Prioritize improving DET over DEF and LOC.
Got to detect the mine before you can do
anything with it.**



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Influence probability distribution

Average Time

T	N	<i>success_D</i>		Time
		LLL	LHL	
2	2	0.000	0.000	
2	3	0.001	0.003	
2	5	0.018	0.030	
2	10	0.073	0.086	
2	15	0.076	0.087	

**Prioritize improving DET over DEF and LOC.
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T	N	<i>success_D</i>		Time
		LLL	LLH	
2	2	0.000	0.000	
2	3	0.001	0.001	
2	5	0.018	0.018	
2	10	0.073	0.074	
2	15	0.076	0.077	

**Prioritize improving DET over DEF and LOC.
Got to detect the mine before you can do
anything with it.**



Experimental Results: *Success* ($D = 250$)

30 robots. Varying number of robots and team sizes.

T	N	$success_D$								Time
		LLL	LLH	LHL	LHH	HLL	HLH	HHL	HHH	seconds
2	15								0.449	87
3	10								0.498	46
6	5								0.494	29
10	3								0.441	35
15	2								0.264	48
30	1								0.003	100

$T = 3$ and $N = 10$ is optimal. *Success* drops off sharply for $N > 5$. Smaller teams have higher likelihood to be completely destroyed or disabled.



Experimental Results: *Coverage* ($D = 250$)

2 teams

Varying team size

DET=Low
DEF=High
LOC=Low

DET=Detection Capability
DEF=Defusing Capability
LOC=Locomotion Capability
Influence probability distribution

Average Time

T	N	DET:DEF:LOC								Time seconds
		LLL	LLH	LHL	LHH	HLL	HLH	HHL	HHH	
2	2	43.3	43.3	48.3	48.4	61.8	62.0	70.6	70.8	7
2	3	60.1	60.2	66.2	66.4	80.8	81.0	89.1	89.3	7
2	5	82.1	82.4	87.5	87.7	97.8	98.1	102.5	102.8	7
2	10	93.5	93.8	96.2	96.5	101.7	102.0	104.6	105.0	7
2	15	93.6	93.9	96.2	96.5	101.7	102.0	104.6	105.0	7

Lesson is the same as for *Success*. Prioritize improving DET over DEF and LOC. Got to detect the mine before you can do anything with it.



Experimental Results: *Coverage* ($D = 250$)

30 robots. Varying number of robots and team sizes.

DET=Detection Capability
DEF=Defusing Capability
LOC=Locomotion Capability
Influence probability distribution

Average Time

T	N	DET:DEF:LOC								Time seconds
		LLL	LLH	LHL	LHH	HLL	HLH	HHL	HHH	
2	15								105.0	7
3	10								109.8	9
6	5								114.9	16
10	3								116.7	25
15	2								116.8	37
30	1								111.9	84

Lesson different from Success. $T = 10$ and $N = 3$ is optimal. More teams have higher likelihood of “covering” more cells, even if they end up getting destroyed.



Related Work

Modeling and verifying **probabilistic systems**

- Pacemakers
- Root-contention protocols
- Biological pathways



Probabilistic verification and **compositionality**


- Compositionality of probabilistic reactive modules

Assume-guarantee reasoning for verifying probabilistic systems

- Learning-based
- Abstraction-refinement
- Hardware designs

Workshop paper: **preliminary** work


- ARMS'13



Conclusion

This paper

- αPA : restricted but useful version of probabilistic automata
- Compositionality theorems
 - Probabilities of satisfying LTL claims
 - Cumulative rewards
- Empirical validation on a robotic de-mining example



Current Work

- Allowing intra-team coordination
- Field tests to see how predictions made by model checker hold up to reality
 - Estimate the atomistic probabilities, plug into the model
 - Refine model as needed





QUESTIONS?

