

# Input Attribution for Statistical Model Checking using Logistic Regression

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September 23, 2016

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This material is based upon work funded and supported by the Department of Defense under Contract No. FA8721-05-C-0003 with Carnegie Mellon University for the operation of the Software Engineering Institute, a federally funded research and development center.

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DM-0004023



# Motivating Example

## Pursuer/Evader Example

- Pursuer and Evader given random initial positions  $(x_p, y_p)$  and  $(x_e, y_e)$  near center of region.
- Evader attempts to reach safe zone in corner.
- Faster moving pursuer attempts to catch evader before it reaches safe zone.


## Statistical Model Checking (SMC)


- Let  $\mathcal{M}$  be the model for the pursuer/evader scenario and  $\Phi$  be the property “the evader reaches safe zone”.
- SMC attempts to answer the question, “What is the probability that  $\mathcal{M} \models \Phi$ ?”


## Input Attribution (IA)

- Asks the question “Why do I get a particular probability estimate?”
- Analog to counter-example in model checking.
- Expressed in terms of the inputs as approximation for the model?

## Pursuer/Evader Example




  
Pursuer  
 $(x_p, y_p)$

  
Evader  
 $(x_e, y_e)$

  
Safe  
Zone

# Statistical Model Checking (SMC)



- System properties described in formal language (UTSL, BLTL, etc.)
- Property is tested on “sample trajectories” (sequence of states)
- Each outcome can be treated as a Bernoulli random variable (i.e., coin flip)

# Statistical Model Checking with Crude Monte-Carlo

The probability that condition  $\Phi$  holds in model  $\mathcal{M}$  when the input  $\vec{x}$  is distributed according to joint pdf  $f(\vec{x})$  is the expected value of that indicator function and can be calculated as:

$$p = E[I_{\mathcal{M} \models \Phi}(\vec{x})] = \int I_{\mathcal{M} \models \Phi}(\vec{x}) f(\vec{x}) d\vec{x}$$


where  $I_{\mathcal{M} \models \Phi}(\vec{x})$  is an indicator function for the model. This can be estimated with Crude Monte-Carlo simulation as:

$$\hat{p} = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N I_{\mathcal{M} \models \Phi}(\vec{x}_i)$$

where each  $\vec{x}_i$  is a sample vector drawn from  $f(\vec{x})$ . As  $N$  gets large,  $\hat{p}$  will converge to  $p$ .

For low probabilities, approximate number of samples required to evaluate to a relative error of RE is:  $N \approx \frac{1}{p(RE)^2}$

Estimated Failure Probability




# of samples in fault region

$$\hat{p} = \frac{1}{10} = 0.1$$

total # of samples

# Input Attribution – The “Why” of SMC

System  $\mathcal{M}$       Predicate  $\Phi$



Problem – Standard SMC provides an estimate on probability that a predicate is satisfied, but does not address why a particular result was obtained.

Goal – Provide investigator with informative non-redundant representation of how system inputs relate to the property being tested:

1. Describes relationship that actually exists in data
2. Is presented in a way that is quantitative and understandable
3. Gives investigator new insights
4. Is resilient to randomness in the system

Approach – Apply machine learning and feature extraction techniques.

- Use *Logistic Regression* to identify “predictors” that affect the probability that a predicate is satisfied.
- Calculate p-values for predictors to indicate significance.
- Look for sets of predictors that can be factored into larger expressions.

Input Attribution

Expression	p-Value
$0.62(a - 1.01d)^2$	0.0013
$4.3b$	0.0042
$1.3(2.3 - c)^2$	0.0172

# Odds vs Probability


Logistic Regression reasons about “odds”

- Alternate representation of probability
- Think of horse racing odds like “7:1”.
- The odds  $\gamma$  of event is related to the probability  $p$  as:

$$p = \frac{\gamma}{\gamma + 1} = \frac{1}{1 + 1/\gamma}$$

- Odds fall in interval:  
 $0 < \gamma < \infty$
- Log of odds fall in interval:  
 $-\infty < \log(\gamma) < \infty$
- Unbounded nature of “log odds” makes it suitable for linear regression analysis.

## Example



Odds

$$\gamma_{SAT} = \frac{100}{200} = 0.5$$

Probability:

$$p_{SAT} = \frac{100}{100 + 200} = 0.333$$

# Logistic Regression (LR)

## Logistic Regression

- Regression model useful when dependent variable is Boolean.
- Based on the logistic function.
- Linear fit of the log of the “odds”.
- Estimates probability that for a particular input the result variable will be true.


## Input

- Set of “trials” consisting of vectors of “predictors” (e.g., input variables) and a dependent Boolean random variable.

## Output

- Set of coefficients for each predictor that fit a linear expression.
- Standard error for each predictor from which a p-Value can be computed.

## Logistic Function



## Log Odds or “Logit”

$$t = \beta_0 + \beta_1 x_1 + \beta_2 x_2 + \cdots + \beta_N x_N$$

## LR Model

$$L(x) = \frac{1}{1 + e^{-\beta_0 + \beta_1 x_1 + \beta_2 x_2 + \cdots + \beta_N x_N}}$$





# Evaluating LR Results (Linear Case)

The factor by which the log odds of a predicate will increase per unit increase of input. Positive values represent increase and negative values represent decrease.

Name	$\beta$	Std.Err.	p-Value
—	-4.28	0.874	0.0000
<i>a</i>	0.154	0.0138	0.0000
<i>b</i>	-1.91	0.3551	0.0000
<i>c</i>	0.0635	0.0277	0.0219
<i>d</i>	5.05	2.77	0.0685

- Calculated by applying inverse normal distribution to ratio of standard error and  $\beta$ .
- Represents probability that  $\beta = 0$  can explain the data.
- Values above a threshold (e.g., 0.05) indicate relation between input and predicate is not statistically significant.

Error in estimation of  $\beta$ .

This predictor is not statistically significant since its p-value is greater than 0.05.

# Polynomial Input Attribution

Find variable pairs with squares and cross terms

## Non-Linear Predictors

- By including non-linear predictors, it may be possible to find a statistically significant solution when linear only terms fail.
- In our work to date, we have focused on quadratic terms (e.g.,  $x^2, y^2, xy$ )
- Higher order or non-polynomial terms could be useful for some systems.

Name	$\beta$	Std.Err.	p-Value
⋮	⋮	⋮	⋮
$a^2$	1.01	0.0148	0.0000
$ab$	-2.04	0.0362	0.0000
$b^2$	1.02	0.0193	0.0219
⋮	⋮	⋮	⋮

## Factoring

- Factored polynomials are easier for humans to understand.
- Since coefficients are approximated, perfect factorings may not be possible.
- Look for approximate factorings which do not adversely affect original coefficients.

Complete square to create candidate factoring

$$1.01(a - 1.01b)^2$$

$$1.01a^2 - 2.04ab + 1.03b^2$$

Re-expand and accept approximation if error is within set factor of std. error.



# Evaluating LR Fit

## Model Verification

- Results of LR only meaningful if overall model fits data.
- LR model  $L(x)$  predicts probability that input  $x$  will satisfy predicate.

## ROC Analysis

- ROC curve is plot of
  - true positives  $P[L(x_i) > \tau | \phi_i]$  vs
  - false positives  $P[L(x_i) > \tau | \bar{\phi}_i]$
  - for  $-\infty < \tau < \infty$
- Area Under Curve (AUC)
  - Represents  $P[L(x_{SAT}) > L(x_{UNSAT})]$  where  $x_{SAT}$  and  $x_{UNSAT}$  are arbitrary inputs resulting in SAT and UNSAT of  $\Phi$ .
  - Values range between 0.5 (model is no better than chance) to 1.0 (perfect fit).



# Evaluating LR Fit

## Model Verification



- Results of LR only meaningful if overall model fits data.
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## ROC Analysis


- ROC curve is plot of
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  - Represents  $P[L(x_{SAT}) > L(x_{UNSAT})]$  where  $x_{SAT}$  and  $x_{UNSAT}$  are arbitrary inputs resulting in SAT and UNSAT of  $\Phi$ .
  - Values range between 0.5 (model is no better than chance) to 1.0 (perfect fit).
  - Use average of 5-fold cross validation to avoid bias.

## 5-Fold Cross Validation

Simulation data with input and predicate results  $x_i, \phi_i$  partitioned into 5 chunks



# V-REP Simulator




# Demeter

Goal: Develop parallel infrastructure for SMC of systems with probabilistic behaviors.

Primary target is autonomous systems.

Demeter components

- Client runs in web browser (e.g. firefox)
- Master runs in Apache server with PHP
- Data stored in MySQL database
- Input Attribution uses R statistical system
- Individual simulations conducted in Docker containers. Managed by “Runner”.



SMC-Runner operate as a Docker container. Each Docker container is managed by Rancher

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# DEMETER

(Distributed Execution of Multiple Experiments and Transfer of Empirical Results)

## List of SMC Runners

Ping All | Flush Offline | Flush All

prev 1 2 3 4 5 6 ... 9 next Total of 216 records.

Id	URL	Host	Registered	Status	Job #	Trial #
1	http://10.42.185.160:5649	cardano:5:25b03941a080	2016-06-06 14:08:07	Online	169	3206076
2	http://10.42.58.227:5649	pascal:2:6b31603b164c	2016-06-06 14:08:07	Online	169	3206077
3	http://10.42.174.124:5649	bose:4:f20141699640	2016-06-06 14:08:07	Online	169	3206078
4	http://10.42.254.239:5649	germain:6:095c8ec71a29	2016-06-06 14:08:07	Online	169	3206079
5	http://10.42.46.139:5649	pascal:8:bf86002bb5d4	2016-06-06 14:08:07	Online	169	3206080
6	http://10.42.76.10:5649	cardano:11:57cd640be75c	2016-06-06 14:08:07	Online	169	3206081
7	http://10.42.32.223:5649	watson:9:c3770ba616cf	2016-06-06 14:08:07	Online	169	3206082
8	http://10.42.73.243:5649	hubble:7:d61840ef695b	2016-06-06 14:08:07	Online	169	3206083
9	http://10.42.71.249:5649	hubble:13:caaf57937ffe	2016-06-06 14:08:07	Online	169	3206084
10	http://10.42.85.55:5649	hubble:1:b3e12b602606	2016-06-06 14:08:07	Online	169	3206085
11	http://10.42.158.117:5649	watson:3:8f918537ad67	2016-06-06 14:08:07	Online	169	3206086
12	http://10.42.188.80:5649	watson:15:563d4fc83c75	2016-06-06 14:08:07	Online	169	3206087
13	http://10.42.62.115:5649	cardano:17:c5a3091f8fb9	2016-06-06 14:08:07	Online	169	3206088
14	http://10.42.147.142:5649	germain:19:c020f78e4d18	2016-06-06 14:08:07	Online	169	3206089
15	http://10.42.187.174:5649	germain:12:8289d11871ef	2016-06-06 14:08:07	Online	169	3206090
16	http://10.42.123.138:5649	bose:10:1baf30ac2fae	2016-06-06 14:08:07	Online	169	3206091
17	http://10.42.205.24:5649	bose:16:c05500c2e80f	2016-06-06 14:08:07	Online	169	3206092
18	http://10.42.201.6:5649	watson:21:f905e333e15e	2016-06-06 14:08:07	Online	169	3206093
19	http://10.42.153.133:5649	pascal:14:080c0b5ffdf1	2016-06-06 14:08:07	Online	169	3206094
20	http://10.42.194.97:5649	pascal:20:6950d188ec0a	2016-06-06 14:08:07	Online	169	3206095
21	http://10.42.223.166:5649	hubble:18:a143bd1136c3	2016-06-06 14:08:07	Online	169	3206096
22	http://10.42.54.162:5649	cardano:23:68ff0727849	2016-06-06 14:08:07	Online	169	3206097
23	http://10.42.212.143:5649	bose:22:3c8e474a355e	2016-06-06 14:08:07	Online	169	3206098
24	http://10.42.250.15:5649	pascal:26:b457408b7978	2016-06-06 14:08:07	Online	169	3206099
25	http://10.42.39.202:5649	watson:33:07e948946e14	2016-06-06 14:08:07	Online	169	3206100

Active Job: 169 (batch 111). Runners: 216 (216 busy)

HOSTS?mode=dot

INFRASTRUCTURE ADMIN SMC

STORAGE POOLS CERTIFICATES

ACTIVE cardano

ACTIVE germain

ACTIVE pascal

ACTIVE watson


Ubuntu 14.04.3 LTS (with KVM)

40x3.1 GHz | 126 GiB | 790 GiB

# Target/Threat Experiment

## Scenario

- Drone flies pre-programmed path over area.
- Along path are “targets” to be photographed.
  - Close to ground → Better chance of good photo.
- Path also includes “threats” to be avoided.
  - Close to ground → More likely to be destroyed.
- Adaptive algorithm with imperfect sensors, sense threats ahead and controls altitude.



## Inputs

- Number of targets/threats
- Target detector range (down)
- Target/Threat detector range/accuracy (forward)
- Threat range

## Predicate

- Drone **photographs at least 50% of targets** while **avoiding being destroyed by threats**.



# Target/Threat Experiment

## Key Observations

- False positives on threats reduce the probability of detecting targets.
  - Reacting to threats that are not there results in drone flying at higher altitude when not necessary and missing some targets.
- Increasing number of targets reduces probability of survival.
  - Drone takes more risks by flying lower to photograph targets.
- False negatives on threat and target detection do not have statistically significant effect on mission, detection or survival probabilities.
  - Verified with additional simulations varying false negative rate. Could indicate problem with adaptation algorithm controlling drone.

## Simulation Results

#Trials:	22,560
P[SAT-mission]:	0.308
P[SAT-survive]:	0.618
P[SAT-detect]:	0.361
Relative Error:	0.05
Batch Size:	120
Run Time:	10 hours, 6 min


## Input Attribution (AUC=0.926)

Name	$\beta$ mission	$\beta$ detect	$\beta$ survive
Target Detector Range	1.33	1.46	
Threat Range	-1.57	-1.189	-2.37
Threat Lookahead	0.233	0.194	0.377
Number of Threats	-0.0892	-0.0943	-0.0792
Number of Targets			-0.0296
Target False Positives			-17.81
Threat False Positives	-3.26	-10.04	32.74



# Motivating Example - Revisited

## Pursuer/Evader Example



Initial hypothesis was that initial distance between pursuer and evader was deciding factor for survival of evader.

Factoring the IA predictors gives us:

$$0.0602(x_e - 1.03x_p)^2 + 0.0561(y_e - 1.09y_p)^2$$

With error less than  $4se(\beta)$  on each coefficient.

Resulting IA expression very close to square of Euclidean distance. Constant factor represents relation between distance and log odds of survival.

## Simulation Results

#Trials:	36,960
# SAT:	7,900
P[SAT]:	0.214
Relative Error:	0.01
Batch Size:	120
Run Time:	5 hours, 20 min

## Input Attribution (AUC=0.77)

Name	$\beta$	$se(\beta)$	p-value
$x_e x_p$	-0.124	0.0027	$< 10^{-4}$
$y_e y_p$	-0.122	0.0027	$< 10^{-4}$
$x_e^2$	0.06	0.0031	$< 10^{-4}$
$y_e^2$	0.056	0.0031	$< 10^{-4}$
$x_p^2$	0.056	0.0031	$< 10^{-4}$
$y_p^2$	0.056	0.0031	$< 10^{-4}$



# Summary

## Addresses the “Why” of SMC

- Concise human understandable justification for SMC probability estimate
- Modeled as expression correlated with the predicate
- Shows which variables are most important

## Uses Logistic Regression

- Regression model useful when dependent variable is Boolean.
- Not dependent on input distribution.
- Commonly used in machine learning applications.

## Extended to Non-Linear Attribution

- Adds non-linear functions of inputs as predictors to model.
- Can find attributions where linear attribution fails.