

ÜBERSPARK[†]: Enforcing Verifiable Object Abstractions for Automated Compositional Security Analysis of a Hypervisor

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Abstract—We present überSpark (üSpark), an innovative architecture for compositional verification of security properties of extensible hypervisors written in C and Assembly. üSpark comprises two key ideas: (i) endowing low-level system software with abstractions found in higher-level languages (e.g., objects, interfaces, function-call semantics for implementations of interfaces, access control on interfaces, concurrency and serialization), enforced using a combination of commodity hardware mechanisms and lightweight static analysis; and (ii) interfacing with platform hardware by programming in Assembly using an idiomatic style (called CASM) that is verifiable via tools aimed at C, while retaining its performance and low-level access to hardware. After verification, the C code is compiled using a certified compiler while the CASM code is translated into its corresponding Assembly instructions. Collectively, these innovations enable compositional verification of security invariants without sacrificing performance. We validate üSpark by building and verifying security invariants of an existing open-source commodity x86 micro-hypervisor and several of its extensions, and demonstrating only minor performance overhead with low verification costs.

1. INTRODUCTION

The modern hypervisor stack is, by necessity, extensible. Hypervisors not only enable the old-hat style of customization, such as modularity for device drivers, but are further extended with convenient functionality for security services such as attestation, debugging, tracing, application-level integrity and confidentiality, trustworthy resource accounting, on-demand I/O isolation, trusted path, and authorization [14], [18], [22], [49], [53], [57], [62], [64], [65], [71], [74], [75], [77], [80], [83]–[86]. Further, the overwhelming majority of the deployed hypervisor codebase is written in low-level C and Assembly, due to hardware accesses, developer familiarity, and performance requirements.

1.1. Problem – The unbridled growth of these extensible hypervisors, while enabling useful functionality,

raises significant security concerns. As the size and complexity of these systems increase – not to mention the number of extensions, which may be active in arbitrary combinations – so has the incidence of security-related bugs. Indeed exploitable bugs in extension interfaces have led to compromises in various hypervisors ranging from complex VMMs to micro-hypervisors [2], [3], [26], [27], [44]. Thus, higher assurance in the security properties offered by hypervisors is critically important.

1.2. Solution – We address this challenge by developing überSpark (üSpark), an architecture for building extensible hypervisors that: (a) is *compatible with commodity systems*; (b) enables *automated compositional verification of security properties*; and (c) produces *performant systems*. Compatibility with commodity systems is crucial to impacting developers and deployment ecosystems. üSpark supports development and verification directly at the C and Assembly source and enables access to more commodity hardware features. It is thus distinct from prior approaches that sacrifice commodity compatibility by employing new programming languages or hardware models [33], [36], [81]. Compositionality means that extensible systems can be verified modularly, rapidly, and independently as they are implemented. Specifically, when an extension is added, üSpark does not require complete system re-verification to re-establish properties. While this goal guides much work in high-level languages, achieving it for low-level languages is a significant challenge. Furthermore, it distinguishes us from verification of full functional correctness [31], [33], [43]. We focus only on security invariants – memory separation, control-flow integrity, information flow – and other extension properties that can be formulated as invariants. We verify such properties directly, compositionally, and automatically on the C and Assembly implementation. This helps bring to commodity-compatible hypervisors those on-going approaches, which offer full functional correctness, but we also enable precise reasoning on untrusted and unverified system code. Finally, the üSpark hypervisor’s performance is close to that of a commodity unverified system.

[†]In the fictional Transformers universe, the AllSpark is a powerful object capable of creating a new Transformer by bestowing ordinary machinery with sparks – the building blocks of a Transformer. In a similar vein, ÜBERSPARK bestows ordinary hypervisors with verifiable objects (ÜOBJECT) for automated compositional security analysis.

Key to the power of üSpark is the enforcement of verifiable-object abstractions to hypervisors. The basic building block is a *üobject*, which encapsulates specific system resources and provides an interface for accessing them – with a well-defined behavioral contract comprising a use manifest along with formal behavior specifications. A *üobject* may represent core components of a hypervisor or an extension and may be concurrent or sequential. Public methods of concurrent *üobjects* are invoked in parallel by multiple cores whereas sequential *üobjects* are implemented as monitors, guarding all method invocations via a per-*üobject* lock. *üObjects* communicate with each other via function calls.

There are two special *üobjects*: *prime* sets up a sane initial state, while *sentinel* ensures control-flow semantics even when *üobjects* with different levels of privilege and trust invoke each other. Together, they enable compositional inductive proofs of security properties expressed as invariants over sequential *üobjects* via source code analysis and hardware assumptions [8]. A third group of special *üAPI üobjects* allow access to shared resources enabling state-of-the-art tools for automatic verification of sequential C code to be soundly applied to verifying security properties, while still allowing multi-threaded high-performance applications.

In keeping with our first and second design goals, üSpark enforces verifiable-object abstractions using a combination of commodity hardware mechanisms (page-tables and de-privileging) and light-weight static analysis, leveraging off-the-shelf C99 source-code analysis and certified-compilation tools. *üObjects*, including *prime* and *sentinel*, are automatically and modularly verified using Frama-C [41], an industrial-strength software analysis and verification framework. We use standard and custom Frama-C plug-ins to perform static verification checks that include: per-*üobject* behavioral contracts (via a standard weakest-precondition plug-in); abstract variable assertions that enable behavioral asserts as well as *üobject* control-flow integrity (via a standard abstract-interpretation plug-in on stack frames and other variables); syntactic checks that ensure conformance with a restricted C99 syntax and logical de-privileging of *üobjects* (via a standard abstract syntax tree analysis plug-in); and, composition checks that enable client *üobjects* that share a common server *üobject* to compose soundly (via a custom composition-check plug-in).

üSpark also provides an idiomatic use of Assembly, called CASM, to separate it from C code during system construction. During analysis with Frama-C, the CASM code is replaced by a C99 hardware model which models key commodity hardware features. Our custom Frama-C plug-in checks that the syntactic restrictions imposed by CASM are respected by every *üobject*. The verified *üobjects* are then compiled into executable binaries. Dur-

ing *üobject* compilation, all C99 code is processed using the certified CompCert compiler [12] while each CASM instruction is replaced by the corresponding Assembly instruction by our custom Frama-C plugin. The CASM language is designed to ensure that the C and Assembly code operate on disjoint state. Our longer-term goal is to guarantee that the verified source code properties carry over to the binary by leveraging the C-Assembly separation and cleanly extending the bisimulation proof of the CompCert compiler to encompass hardware state and Assembly code. In addition, we aim to ensure the semantic equivalence between the hardware model and the corresponding Assembly instructions. Proving these guarantees formally appears straightforward, and need only be done once for the üSpark framework, but we leave it to future work.

The üSpark object abstraction is distinguished from other systems in that it allows many fine-grained objects in privileged mode. Static analysis enforces logical de-privileging of those objects – e.g., a hypervisor module running in host-mode ring 0 is precluded from accessing page-table structures, thereby being “logically” deprivileged – while control transfer between them does not involve a context switch, thereby significantly helping with system performance, our third design goal.

1.3. Contributions – (a) We present üSpark, an innovative architecture providing verifiable object abstractions for automated compositional verification of hypervisor security properties while targeting commodity compatibility and performance (§4,§5). (b) We use üSpark to incrementally develop and verify security properties of an existing open-source commodity x86 micro-hypervisor with multiple independent security extensions (hypervisor and extensions realized as 11 *üobjects* with 7001 SLoC; 5544 and 2079 lines of annotations and hardware model; §6,§7). (c) We carry out a comprehensive evaluation showcasing verification metrics, development effort and performance, and report on our experience (1 person yr; *üobject* verification times from 1–23 minutes with a cumulative time \approx 1hr; 2% average runtime overhead over native micro-hypervisor applications with guest performance unaffected; §8,§9).

2. A MOTIVATING EXAMPLE

To motivate and explain üSpark, we use as a running example, a hypervisor that closely corresponds to our case study. Imagine the hypervisor managing a multi-CPU guest, and supporting optional security extensions that implement various guest-specific and system-wide security properties. The hypervisor manages system devices used by itself, by extensions, and by the guest. System devices execute device firmware in parallel with the CPUs and perform DMA. The hypervisor and extensions are written in C and Assembly.

The hypervisor leverages CPU capabilities, such as memory-mapped I/O (MMIO) and legacy I/O, for system-to-device interaction; it initializes boot CPU (BSP) state; it sets up memory page tables, as well as device allocations and DMA protections (e.g., via an IOMMU); it initializes multi-CPU support via the Local Advanced Programmable Interrupt Controller (LAPIC) and activates other CPUs and sets up their memory page tables and appropriate protections. Constructing a verified hypervisor of this sort, the developers must not only build it and test it well, but also verify its code against a set of general safety properties (e.g., memory integrity) as well as functional invariants on hardware and software state (e.g., IOMMU, LAPIC, CPU states).

Consider now adding two new *verified* extensions to the hypervisor: **hyperdep**, which ensures that guest-VM data pages are non-executable; and (b) **sysclog**, which ensures that every system call issued by the guest is logged via a dedicated network card to an external trusted entity on the network. In order to preserve the verified status of the system, the developers must prove that: (a) memory integrity is not violated by the extensions; (b) each extension provides its claimed property to guests configured to use it; and (c) the extensions are used in tandem by a guest if and only if they provide a well-defined compositional property (e.g., separability). This is non-trivial, since it requires the construction and verification of inductive invariants that imply the core security properties of the hypervisor, and those of enabled extensions. Also, since extensions are optional, verification must account for all possible configurations – e.g., enabling either **hyperdep**, or **sysclog**, or both – while avoiding the combinatorial blowup.

Of course, history tells us that two extensions are never enough for any extensible system. What is more, not all extensions come from the same developers or with the same pedigree. Consider, for instance, an *unverified*, strictly optional extension to the hypervisor; this might be an extension that provides essential functionality, but has not been verified, and is taken as an acceptable risk. For our example, let us use **aprveexec**, an extension that ensures that guest code pages contain only read-only, whitelisted content. As with **hyperdep** and **sysclog**, core hypervisor properties, and the properties of other extensions should not be violated by running **aprveexec**, and the risk of running **aprveexec** should only be suffered by a guest that explicitly enables it and relies on its presumed properties. Note that the guest itself, unless it is verified as rigorously as the rest of the hypervisor, is such an unverified component in the system.

3. GOALS AND ASSUMPTIONS

3.1. Goals – Our overarching goal is to enable development of performant extensible hypervisors offering pro-

ofs of wide-ranging properties on their code, including low-level memory safety, control-flow guarantees, and information flow, as well as higher-level properties such as trusted network logging (**sysclog**) and data execution prevention (**hyperdep**), going all the way up to security properties spanning both hardware and software states (IOMMU, LAPIC, network-card and CPU). Also, verification must support properties over shared system states: e.g., both **hyperdep** and **sysclog** manipulate guest memory protections via the same guest page-tables. Our design goals fall broadly in three categories.

3.1.1. Compositionality: When new components are added, or existing components changed, human re-verification effort should be limited to the changed codebase, yet it should provide guarantees about the entire system under all possible configurations.

3.1.2. Legacy Compatibility & Usability: Our development and verification approach must integrate into the existing hypervisor C and Assembly language programming ecosystem, and cover the entire source code base including commodity hardware and guest OS. We must support extensions that are unverified in order to preserve the legacy ecosystem. However, unverified code (e.g., the guest) must not violate system properties established by verified code. Our development and verification techniques must foster wider adoption by hypervisor developers. We envision that entry-level developers will rely on basic building blocks to provide simple properties while seasoned developers will harness the full verification power to provide stronger guarantees.

3.1.3. Performance: Verification must not preclude aggressive code optimizations for individual components, including extensions, and must not adversely affect runtime performance. Further, commodity guest OS on multi-core hardware must be supported.

3.2. Non-goals – We do not aim for full functional correctness (i.e., verifying that the implementation behaves exactly as specified in a high-level abstraction). This separates the concerns of showing how a complex low-level system achieves low-level formal properties from how those low-level properties refine a high-level abstract model; we focus on the former, since it is a hard and as yet open problem, whereas much on-going work tackles the latter [31], [42].

3.3. Attacker Model and Assumptions – We assume that the attacker does not have physical access to the CPU, memory, chipset or other verified extension-specific system devices (our hardware TCB). Other system devices, the guest OS, and unverified extensions are under the attacker’s control. This is reasonable since a majority of today’s attacks are mounted by malicious software or untrusted system devices. We assume that our hardware TCB is functionally correct, and we have load-time integrity, i.e., the verified hypervisor is the one

securely loaded onto the hardware at boot time. Finally, we assume that the verification tools we use are sound.

4. ÜSPARK ARCHITECTURE

We next describe our architecture, and how it addresses our goals (§3.1) via verifiable object abstractions (Fig 1)

4.1. üObjects – The basic building block in üSpark– the “üobject” – is used to contain any system component including verified and unverified hypervisor and guest blobs and system devices. Logically, a üobject is a singleton object guarding some otherwise indivisible resources (e.g., registers, memory, devices) and implementing public methods to access them. Public methods are essentially regular function signatures but can be restricted to specific callers (§4.2.1). Every üobject also has a special public method, *init*, to set up the üobject in a known-good initial state. A üobject may be concurrent or sequential. The public methods of a concurrent üobject can be invoked in parallel on multiple cores. In contrast, at most one core can invoke the methods of a sequential üobject at a time, as with a traditional monitor. When multiple cores are active, sequential execution is enforced via per-üobject locks.

Each üobject defines its functionality using C and Assembly. Assembly language for a verified üobject is written using CASM, a dialect of C in which Assembly instructions are encoded within regular C functions (CASM functions) via C-like pseudo-function calls (CASM instructions¹). For example, for the x86 instruction `movcr3` involving register `eax` there is a corresponding CASM pseudo-function called `ci_movl_eax_cr3`. Each CASM instruction pseudo-function is defined in the üSpark hardware model (§7.1.2) and bridges the shift between the reference C semantics and the hardware instructions (e.g. access to memory and to registers). During verification, each CASM instruction is replaced by the C source code from the hardware model. The resulting C-only program is verified for required properties. CASM functions are verified to respect the C application binary interface (ABI), which is crucial for the soundness of verification. During compilation, all C functions are processed via a certified compiler while each CASM instruction is replaced by the corresponding Assembly instruction. In contrast to prior code-level verification approaches (§10), CASM supports two-way nested C to Assembly calling with full device modeling. This allows using various verification techniques to prove (higher-level) properties on device states other than just memory and numeric

¹CASM syntax is similar to existing “asm” keywords supported by traditional C compilers for integrating Assembly language instructions. However, CASM provides a more principled way to integrate Assembly instructions tailored for verification while retaining performance.

safety (§7.2). CASM also allows aggressive compiler optimizations of the callee C functions including inlining as per compiler specifications, resulting in optimal runtime performance (§8.3). We envision further optimizations including inlining of hand-written CASM code as part of our future work (§11.2).

Beyond defining its own functionality, a üobject is also accompanied by a behavior *contract*. This consists of a *use manifest* (§4.3) and a formal *behavior specification* of its own public interface, which guarantee that if a certain assumption is satisfied in how a public method is invoked, then a property on the return values is guaranteed to hold upon return of that method, without mention of internal üobject state.

Every üobject is held to a number of invariants, which together guarantee its adherence to the verifiable-object abstraction. These invariants include memory and (internal) control-flow integrity, so that the code can be reasoned about; and satisfaction of the formal contract, so that the contract alone may overapproximate the üobject, thereby enabling compositional verification; as well as correct initialization. The invariants are discharged via assumptions on the hardware and proofs on the source code of the üobject, and on the contract of üobjects it interacts with (§5, §7.2).

While our use of object encapsulation is similar to existing micro-kernel architectures [42] and prior capability systems [32], [63], üSpark is distinguished by privileged disaggregation, i.e., multiple verified privileged üobjects can be logically deprivileged. This enables us to achieve the sweet spot with both high performance (there is no hardware de-privileging overhead; §8.3.1) and compositional verification (privileged üobjects can be verified separately; §7.2).

4.1.1. Prime: is the first üobject to execute in a üSpark enabled hypervisor. Prime is verified to satisfy its contract which is: to set up the required system interfaces and associated policies, establish operating stacks, prepare the platform CPU cores, invoke the *init* methods of other üobjects to initialize their state, and kick-start üobject interactions.

4.2. üObject Interaction – A üobject interacts with another by invoking a public method in its interface with appropriate parameters. All verified üobjects operate on a single stack (one per CPU core) that is set up initially by the prime. Each unverified üobject uses its own, separate stack. The verifiable-object abstraction requires üobject-to-üobject control-flow integrity (otherwise returns could land at arbitrary üobject program sites, access controls would be violated, etc.). Therefore, üobjects must also be verified to use their stack correctly (another invariant). For unverified üobjects, that also means that stacks must be switched to/from the unverified üobject stack and a separate shadow stack must be maintained for storing




Fig. 1: überSpark: enforces verifiable object abstractions using a combination of commodity hardware and software verification mechanisms to: (a) translate synchronous (call) and asynchronous (e.g., exceptions, intercepts) inter-üobject control transfers, to establish pure function call-return semantics; and (b) establish üobject resource confinement.

return addresses during control transfers. The special *sentinel* üobject performs (verifiably) this functionality.

4.2.1. Sentinel: is a special üobject that mediates interactions among other üobjects. Thus, an invocation of a public method of a callee üobject by a caller üobject is intercepted by the sentinel and dispatched only after a number of optional runtime checks have succeeded.

These runtime checks logically ensure that the caller may invoke a given public method on the callee according to the üobject manifest (§4.3). For example, an extension can be split between a top half and a bottom half as with traditional device drivers (in our case study, **sysclog** could shed its networking code into a separate üobject, **sysclognw**, that only takes transmission requests from **sysclog**, and is the only authorized user of a separate NIC dedicated to logging), ensuring that only the top half may invoke the bottom half at runtime, while still keeping the two isolated from each other and independently verifiable. If caller and callee are both verified, then no runtime check is required, since static analysis enforces the call policy (§4.3). If one is unverified, the sentinel consults the policy dynamically and allows or rejects the call accordingly.

Besides the runtime checks, the sentinel is responsible for transferring control among üobjects. If both are verified, the control transfer is just a function call. But if either is unverified, the sentinel must employ the appropriate control-transfer method for the isolation mechanism imposed on the unverified üobject (e.g., if using ring-based isolation, switch privilege levels and stacks, marshal arguments, etc.). The sentinel may implement control transfers according to a number of concrete

ways (hardware virtual machines, software fault isolation, etc.), while still adhering to the high-level invariant for isolation. For example, in our micro-hypervisor implementation, the sentinel traverses both ring-based isolated üobjects, and hardware virtual machines (§6).

The sentinel is an üobject, so it adheres to the same invariants as regular üobjects, but it is also verified to implement its function correctly (perform the checks, properly transfer control, etc.).

4.3. üObject Resource Confinement – überSpark implements *üobject resource confinement* in which distinct system resources are: (a) managed by designated üobjects, (b) protected from access by unauthorized üobjects, and (c) regulated in their use by authorized client üobjects. Such resources include üobject local memory (code, data, stack), system memory (e.g., BIOS data, free memory), CPU state and privileged instructions, system devices and I/O regions. Every üobject includes a *use manifest* in its contract that describes which resources it may access. It is held to the property that it can only use the resources declared in its manifest.

For verified üobjects, überSpark employs a hardware model identifying CPU interfaces to system resources (e.g., I/O and designated memory instructions interface to system devices, instructions that can modify CPU model specific register states, etc.) and static analysis to ensure that access to those interfaces respects the üobject’s manifest (§7). For example, **sysclog**’s manifest shows that it may access the dedicated NIC for its remote logging, and static analysis ensures that the code for **sysclog** may access only that NIC, nor can any other üobject access **sysclog**’s NIC.

In contrast, unverified üobjects are held to their use manifests via more direct enforcement mechanisms, such as hardware MMU and privilege protections (virtualization, de-privileging) and software manipulations (e.g., SFI). Unverified üobjects can also be granted direct access to exclusively held system devices so they can perform I/O without any performance overhead (e.g., a guest OS üobject is allocated all the devices except the LAPIC and **sysclog**’s network card). Device üobjects use DMA as their interface to other üobjects. überSpark uses hardware IOMMU capabilities to ensure that device üobjects are restricted to perform DMA only to designated üobject DMA memory regions.

4.3.1. üAPI üobjects: are a special set of üobjects that encapsulate shared resources over which system properties are established (§6.4). For example, guest OS üobject memory and CPU state are manipulated by multiple extensions (**hyperdep** and **sysclog**). überSpark enforces a composition check (§7.2.1), which for a given set of üAPI üobjects checks if a set of “client” üobjects are composable. Note that every üAPI üobject also performs compositability checks at runtime for invocations from

unverified \ddot{u} objects. Such composability checks reason about the use-manifest portion of a client \ddot{u} object’s contract, which constrains how that \ddot{u} object invokes the \ddot{u} API’s public methods, ensuring some system-specific and \ddot{u} API-specific composability guarantee, such as separability. Client \ddot{u} objects must satisfy the property that whenever they invoke a \ddot{u} API call, they obey their own use manifest, and \ddot{u} Spark discharges this property via static analysis on verified \ddot{u} objects or runtime sentinel checks for unverified \ddot{u} objects.

4.4. \ddot{u} Spark Blueprint – \ddot{u} Spark also defines a hypervisor *blueprint* (\ddot{u} BP), which a hypervisor implementation is held to. The \ddot{u} BP is a high-level control-flow graph that divides hypervisor execution into three phases: startup, intercept, and exception handling which can in turn be customized based on the actual number of system \ddot{u} objects and their interactions (Figure 2; §6). The \ddot{u} BP along with our high-level proofs (§5) enables us to abstract the hypervisor, running on multi-core platform hardware with system devices and DMA, as a non-deterministic sequential program. This, in turn, allows us to prove invariant properties of \ddot{u} objects, and the hypervisor as a whole, via sequential source-code verification. Further, the \ddot{u} BP also enforces that fragile bits of the hardware state (e.g., CPU and IOMMU) are only touched within a monitor. This, allows us to prove invariant properties encompassing hardware states and keeps our hardware model simple by precluding modeling of concurrent hardware accesses (§7.1.2).

5. \ddot{U} SPARK FORMALISM

We present a formalization of \ddot{u} Spark that justifies the soundness of our analysis. For brevity, we first give an overview of the formal reasoning followed by our high-level verification approach and related theorems. Full proof details can be found in our technical report [73].

5.1. \ddot{u} Spark Formalism Overview – \ddot{u} Spark reasoning relies foundationally on a set of invariants – properties that must hold throughout the execution of a \ddot{u} Spark hypervisor (Appendix A). The invariants are divided into \ddot{u} Spark system invariants and \ddot{u} Spark general programming invariants (those that pertain specifically to \ddot{u} object C and CASM functions). Each invariant is proved by reducing it further to a set of *proof-assumptions on hardware* (PAHs) and *proof-obligations on code* (POCs) using the \ddot{u} Spark blueprint (\ddot{u} BP; Fig. 2). POCs are then discharged on all \ddot{u} Spark verified \ddot{u} objects including the prime and sentinel using specific verification tools and techniques (§7). A hypervisor implementation is compliant with \ddot{u} Spark– and therefore amenable to compositional reasoning – if it satisfies all the \ddot{u} Spark invariants. Full details of invariant-to-PAH/POC mappings, a one-time effort, is described in [73]. At a high level, \ddot{u} Spark invariants ensure the hypervisor implementation follows

the \ddot{u} BP and that prime is correct, and the first to start in the system, and that it sets up memory protections, stacks, and CPUs, before starting other execution contexts in a well-defined state. The remaining invariants guarantee that \ddot{u} objects have memory and control-flow integrity, and the sentinel properly transfers control among them, respecting the concurrent or sequential designation.

5.2. Verification Approach and Theorems – There are two tasks in verifying properties of a \ddot{u} Spark hypervisor: (a) showing that it obeys the \ddot{u} Spark invariants; and (b) showing that it obeys any hypervisor/extension-specific invariant properties. The benefit of (a) is that developers can express system-specific properties in terms of \ddot{u} objects and their interactions with each other, yet verify those properties separately on each individual \ddot{u} object in isolation, and on the ensemble of the behavior contracts of all \ddot{u} objects, without having to perform slow verification of the combined source code for the whole code base.

Crucial to the model of \ddot{u} object are CASM programs, defined below. First, we define a *CASM function* as a CompCert-C99 (CC99) function whose body consists only of a block of Assembly instructions that respect the CC99 ABI. A \ddot{u} object CASM program is a CC99 program such that: (i) all Assembly code appears only in CASM functions; and (ii) these CASM functions preserve the caller C functions’ CPU register state.

Given a \ddot{u} object CASM program, we are interested in verifying two kinds of properties: (1) invariant properties: whether φ holds at every state (after every instruction), and (2) individual state assertions: whether φ holds at specific program points. We can also specify assumptions (i.e., preconditions), stating that we assume φ holds when a function is called. Verification tools such as Frama-C (§7) take programs annotated with properties to be checked and decide whether the properties hold on all execution traces of the program.

We begin by stating two \ddot{u} Spark theorems essential for the correctness of our approach, which follow directly from the \ddot{u} Spark programming invariants (Appendix A).

Theorem 1 (DISJOINTCASM). *The union of \ddot{u} object CASM and C functions preserve the existing semantic preservation property of the certified compiler.*

Theorem 2 (EXITSENTINEL). *\ddot{u} object execution can only exit via the sentinel.*

The next theorem states that each \ddot{u} Spark execution is an interleaving of properly nested executions of \ddot{u} objects, one on each core (a more formal definition can be found in [73]). Intuitively, it means that \ddot{u} object calls and returns are properly nested except that the return of an unverified \ddot{u} object can be an exception, as an unverified




Fig. 2: üSpark Hypervisor Blueprint: startup, intercept and exception handling execution phases. *Rounded boxes = iobjects; Square boxes = nested iobject calls; Arrows = intra- and inter-iobject transitions; Single-lines = serialized execution; Double-lines = concurrent execution.*

iobject can lie about its return address, but will be caught by the hardware if it steps out of the iobject memory. This theorem enables us to view üSpark semantically as a concurrent object-oriented program, which is then abstracted as a non-deterministic sequential program for verification.

Theorem 3 (NESTEDCALL). *Consider a legal execution π of üSpark and a sequential iobject s . The projection of π on executions of s consists of a sequence of properly nested executions of s , each on a specific core.*

5.2.1. Hardware Model and Converting Assembly to C: We use C verification tools to verify CASM functions in iobjects by converting Assembly to C. In addition to general-purpose registers (which are preserved to respect the CC99 ABI) these Assembly instructions access special hardware registers (e.g., LAPIC). Let us denote the set of registers accessed by CASM functions in üSpark by \mathcal{R}_{hw} . We introduce a set of fresh C variables (denoted \mathcal{V}_{hw}), one for each register; replace each Assembly instruction accessing \mathcal{R}_{hw} by one or more CC99 statements that operate in a semantically equivalent way over \mathcal{V}_{hw} ; replace each $r \in \mathcal{V}_{hw}$ with v_r in assertions used for specifying hardware state during verification. We refer to the mapping between \mathcal{R}_{hw} and \mathcal{V}_{hw} , and the induced mapping from Assembly instructions to CC99 statements, as our *hardware model*. We assume that this mapping is correct. We refer to the CC99 function obtained by transforming a CASM function f in this manner as f .

5.2.2. Abstract üSpark: We abstract iobjects as a non-deterministic CC99 (NDCC99) program, i.e., a CC99 program with non-deterministic selection of values from finite sets. In particular, the abstract üSpark üBP consists of a set of abstract iobjects, where each abstract iobject \tilde{s} is obtained from the corresponding concrete iobject s by converting each function $g \in p(s)$ to an

abstract function \tilde{g} ; more concretely: by replacing all CASM functions as described above, replacing accesses to data that other cores and devices can modify by non-deterministic values, replacing a call to an unverified iobject by a call to the intercept handler iobject with non-deterministic arguments. The next theorem states that each function g in a sequential iobject refines its abstract version \tilde{g} in that for each properly nested execution of g , there is a corresponding execution of \tilde{g} . This is crucial to the soundness of our verification.

Theorem 4 (EXECREFINE). *If g is a function belonging to a sequential iobject such that all Assembly code in g is in a CASM function satisfying all üSpark programming invariants, and c is any core, then for each properly nested execution τ of g on c there is a corresponding execution $\tilde{\tau} \in \llbracket \tilde{g} \rrbracket$ such that: $\tau \equiv \tilde{\tau}$, where $\tau \equiv \tilde{\tau}$ lifts the per-state equivalence to the trace.*

We use C verification tools to verify POCs directly on üBP (NDCC99 programs) of üSpark. Theorem 4 allows us to lift the verification results to iobject source-code, formally stated in the following theorem (we only show the statement for invariant properties; the statement for individual state assertions is similar).

Theorem 5 (INVCOMPOSE). *Given any sequential iobject s , let \tilde{s} be the üBP abstraction of s . If an invariant property φ holds on every execution of $g(s)$, then φ is an invariant property of every execution of s .*

6. ÜSPARK HYPERSIVOR IMPLEMENTATION

We applied üSpark to XMHF, an open-source micro-hypervisor for the x86 32-bit hardware-virtualized platform [72]. Originally, XMHF consists of a core hypervisor and a single extension (called *hypapp*), that together implement security-specific functionality. The latest version (0.2.2) runs a Ubuntu 12.04 32-bit multi-core guest OS with the core and hypapp at the highest

privilege level and has been used to develop a wide variety of security applications [53], [74], [83], [85], [86]. Our goal is `üXMHF`— an incrementally developed and verified version with deprivileged components, and multiple hypapps. As a first step, we refactor `XMHF` into: (a) verified hypervisor (*vh*) `üobjects` for prime, sentinel, core, `üAPIs`, and verified hypapps; (b) unverified hypervisor (*uh*) `üobjects` for unverified hypapps; and (c) unverified guest (*ug*) `üobjects` for the OS (Figure 2); §8 quantifies this refactoring effort.

6.1. Core, Hypapp and Guest `üObjects` – We instantiate `üXMHF` core using three *vh* `üobjects`: `xcstrt` (startup), `xcihub` (handling *ug* `üobject` intercepts), and `xcehub` (runtime hardware exception and watchdog handling). We instantiate extensions described in §2 as separate *vh* and *uh* `üobjects` and add support for multiple hypapps within `xcihub`. Finally, we instantiate a *ug* `üobject`, `guest` for the guest OS. The `xcstrt` `üobject` gets control from the prime `üobject` (§6.2), invokes all registered hypapp `üobjects` for initialization, and then transfers control to `guest`. The `xcihub` `üobject` gets control from the sentinel upon any intercept (§6.3) and in turn invokes the hypapp `üobjects` for `guest` event processing. Upon intercept handling, `xcihub` resumes execution of `guest` *ug* `üobject` (Figure 2).

6.2. Prime `üObject` – The `üXMHF` boot-loader uses the `GETSEC[SENTER]` instruction to setup a dynamic-root-of-trust and invokes the prime `üobject` in a hardware protected execution environment with the CPUs in a known good state and interrupts and DMA disabled.

Prime first enumerates devices and uses VT-d IOMMU to restrict their DMA to designated memory regions. It then initializes the *vh* and *uh* PAE page tables and the *ug* 2D EPT page tables for memory protections such that: (i) *vh* page tables map *vh* `üobject` memory regions, including MMIO, with supervisor privileges, and all *uh* and *ug* `üobject` memory regions as user with read-write permissions; (ii) each *uh* and *ug* page tables marks only its own region, including MMIO, as user and present; (iii) for *uh* `üobjects`, all *vh* `üobject` memory regions are marked supervisor; and (iv) for *ug* `üobjects` all *vh* and *uh* memory regions including MMIO are marked not-present. Prime uses disjoint CPU I/O bitmaps (which are marked supervisor within *uh* and *ug* `üobject` page tables) for *uh* and *ug* `üobjects`’ legacy I/O isolation.

Finally, for each CPU in the system, prime: (a) activates protected-mode with paging and hypervisor-mode via control registers `CR0` and `CR4` and the `VMXON` instruction; (b) sets up `SYSENTER` MSR, interrupt descriptor table and VM control structure (VMCS) to transfer control to the sentinel; and (c) loads *vh* page tables in `CR3` and transfers control to `xcstrt` core startup `üobject`.

6.3. Sentinel `üObject` – For *vh* to *vh* `üobject` control transfers, the sentinel uses an indirect `JMP` instruction.

The `SYSEXIT` and `SYSENTER` fast system call instructions are used *vh* to *uh* control transfers and vice-versa. In such cases, the sentinel loads the *uh* page tables into the `CR3` register and transfers control to the *uh* `üobject` entry point (or return address via the `SYSEXIT` instruction) at the de-privileged level. The sentinel uses the `VMLAUNCH` instruction for a call from a *vh* to *ug* `üobject`. It handles intercepts by transferring control to the *vh* `xcihub` `üobject` and upon return from `xcihub` resumes the *ug* `üobject` via the `VMRESUME` instruction. In both cases, it loads the *ug* `üobject` EPTs prior to the launch. The sentinel handles exceptions by transferring control to the *vh* `xcehub` `üobject`. Upon return from `xcehub` execution is resumed via the `IRET` instruction.

6.4. `üAPI` `üObjects` – Both the core and hypapp `üobjects` use `üAPI` `üobjects` to influence the *ug* `üobject` state. This state includes the *ug* `üobject` EPTs and VMCS. We implement `üAPI` `üobjects` `ugmpgtbl` and `ugcpust` which present interfaces to the *ug* `üobject` EPTs and VMCS respectively. We also implement an additional `üAPI` `üobject` `uhcpust` as an interface to shared CPU state between *vh* and *uh* `üobjects` (e.g., MSRs).

6.5. `üObject` Runtime Library – `üObjects` rely on a set of common functionality implemented in the following libraries: (a) `libuc` with memory and string functions; (b) `libucrypt` with SHA-1 functionality; (c) `libustub` with `üobject` entry and sentinel CASM stubs; and (d) `libuhw` for platform hardware access.

7. ÜSPARK HYPERVISOR VERIFICATION

7.1. Verification and Development Tools – We first describe the verification and development tools we use.

7.1.1. Static Analysis with Frama-C: Frama-C [41] is an industrial-strength C99 static analysis and verification toolkit, written in type-safe OCaml. It has a modular architecture and offers different plugins for distinct styles of analysis. We use the following Frama-C plugins: *Deductive verification* via Frama-C’s Weakest-Precondition (WP) plugin enables the verification of assume-guarantee behavior specifications on C functions. Those specifications are expressed in the Annotated ANSI C Specification Language (ACSL) [25] in terms of the C source variables and operations. The WP plugin verifies such ACSL specifications statically on the body of the function by discharging verification conditions via an ensemble of external SMT solvers. *Abstract interpretation* via Frama-C’s Value plugin analyzes a program using a sound abstraction of its concrete semantics. It is used to prove ACSL assertions placed in the body of the program that express partial specifications about program variables, and can be combined with deductive verification. *Abstract syntax tree (AST) analysis* via Frama-C’s AST plugin performs syntactic analysis on control-flow

graphs and ASTs to enforce syntactic restrictions, e.g., the absence of primitives like function pointers.

7.1.2. Hardware Model: We have implemented a C99 hardware model for the commodity x86 hardware-virtualized platform, by representing platform features such as CPU registers and system-device states as C variables and describing formally how the hardware (should) behave. The hardware model is a re-usable but trusted component. Our hardware model allows for iterative development, modeling only portions of the device used in proving security invariants. This design principle, coupled with serialization enforced by the üSpark architecture blueprint (§4.4), enables us to keep the hardware model simple and amenable to formal validations. Various techniques exist to validate such a hardware model [50], [58] which we plan on exploring as future work (§11).

7.1.3. üSpark Frama-C Plugins: We built üSpark-specific plugins on top of Frama-C as follows: (a) übp – enforces üSpark blueprint; (b) ühwm – embeds hardware model during verification; (c) ücasm – substitutes Assembly mnemonics corresponding to CASM instructions after verification; (d) ücc – enforces general üSpark coding rules; (e) ümf – parses üobject manifest; and (f) ücvf – performs composition check (§7.2.1). These üSpark-specific plugins do not impact the robustness of the Frama-C toolset as we do not modify the kernel or standard plugins. Further, Frama-C’s modular architecture helps us keep üSpark-specific Frama-C plugins small, simple, and amenable to manual audits to ensure correctness (§8.1).

7.1.4. Frama-C and CompCert: In keeping with our longer term goal of guaranteeing that the verified source code properties carry over to the binary, we employ the CompCert [11], [12], [46] certified C99 compiler to compile üobjects. CompCert over-specifies C99 implementation-defined and unspecified behaviors and is formally verified to produce semantically equivalent Assembly from a C99 program. Our choice of Frama-C and CompCert is further justified by their semantic compatibility. We empirically tested Frama-C against CompCert’s C99 specifications and found that both tools had the same treatment of C99 implementation-defined and unspecified behaviors. Further, both tools employ an identical byte-addressable memory model with base addresses and offsets. Therefore, they combine naturally into a powerful analysis and development workflow towards producing verified system binaries.

7.1.5. Soundness Via Weakening: We weaken our execution model in two cases to enable sound reasoning. First, since current state-of-the-art static analyzers including Frama-C largely assume sequential execution, we treat all reads to DMA memory and all memory reads by a concurrent üobject as non-deterministic, for verification

```

1 void ugmptbl_setentry(u32 gsid, u32 addr, u64 v) {
2 /*sysclog*/ {v=v&7; v&=~_X; v|=_R; v|=_W;}
3 /*hyperdep*/ {v=v&7; v&=~_X; v|=_R; v|=_W;}
4 /*@assert sysclog: (!(v&_X) && (v&_R) && (v&_W));*/
5 /*@assert hyperdep: (!(v&_X) && (v&_R) && (v&_W));*/
6 }

```

(a)

```

7 void ugmptbl_setentry(u32 gsid, u32 addr, u64 v) {
8 /* sysclog */ {v=v&7; v&=~_X; v|=_R; v|=_W;}
9 /* aprvexec */ {v=v&7; v&=~_W; v|=_R; v|=_X;}
10 /*@assert sysclog: (!(v&_X) && (v&_R) && (v&_W));*/
11 /*@assert aprvexec: (!(v&_W) && (v&_R) && (v&_X));*/
12 }

```

(b)

Fig. 3: Composition check: (a) **hyperdep** and **sysclog** üobjects both use ugmptbl üAPI setentry interface to set guest memory page protections in a composable manner. (b) **sysclog** and **aprvexec** both use setentry in a non-composable manner.

to soundly model interference from devices and other cores. Second, we preclude use of C function pointers and CASM indirect jump instructions, which remain challenging for current state-of-the-art static analyzers [21]. In practice (§7.2), this weakening does not stop us from verifying important security properties, since such properties are implemented via sequential üobjects using non-DMA memory.

7.2. üXMHF Verification – Verification of üXMHF consists of: (a) üobject composition check, and (b) verifying üSpark invariants (§5) and üobject local properties. Throughout this section we use *vh*, *uh* and *ug* as acronyms for verified and unverified hypervisor and unverified guest üobjects respectively.

7.2.1. üObject Composition Check: Resources accessed by multiple üobjects are guarded by üAPI üobjects (§4.3.1). Here we check that all üobjects are composable over the set of üAPIs they use. At a high level, this is checked by constructing an assertion that captures the conjunction of the possible values that the two üobjects write to a shared resource, and then verifying that this assertion is not violated. More specifically, for every üAPI üobject, an interface stub function is first created using its manifest. Next, the stub is populated with invariant definitions and assertions (if any) listed in the manifest of every *vh* and *uh* non-üAPI üobject that invokes it. Figure 3a shows an example stub for ugmptbl üAPI üobject setentry interface with **hyperdep** and **sysclog** hypapps enabled. Lines 2–6 are populated using the corresponding hypapp üobject manifests. Figure 3b shows the same stub with **sysclog** and **aprvexec** hypapps enabled. Finally, the assertions in the stub are verified under *non-deterministic* inputs. For example, **hyperdep** and **sysclog** both set the read, write and clear the execute bits for the memory protections of the provided guest memory-page (lines 2–3) and are therefore composable; the assertions (lines 4–6) in Figure 3a are valid. However, **sysclog** and **aprvexec** are not composable (Figure 3b) since **aprvexec** sets the execute bit while **sysclog** clears the execute bit in the protections for the provided memory-page (lines 9–

10). Note, such composition check assertions are also performed at runtime for üAPI invocations from *uh* üobjects (§4.3.1). This composition check procedure is üXMHF-specific, and a more general check is an interesting direction for future work.

7.2.2. üObject Compositional Verification: As we discussed in §5, we first verify üSpark invariants via a set of PAHs and specific POCs on all *vh* üobjects including the prime and sentinel. §7.2.3 describes POC verification in further detail. We then verify each of the üXMHF core, hypapp and üAPI üobjects for their local invariants. For brevity we summarize the **hyperdep** üobject verification approach here. Appendix B lists the invariants and verification approach for other üXMHF üobjects. **hyperdep** preserves the following invariant over the `ugmpgtbl setentry` üAPI: guest OS provided memory pages are marked read-write and not executable. We use deductive verification to verify the **hyperdep** üobject `activate` method to ensure that the guest page address that is passed is used as the parameter to the `ugmpgtbl` üobject `setentry` method with read, write and no-execute protections. Finally, we verify the üobject runtime library (§6.5) for memory safety including behavior specifications for the memory and string functions within `libc`. Note, *uh* üobjects are not verified since their properties follow from üAPI invariants. ensured by our composition check (§7.2.1).

7.2.3. POC Verification: For brevity, we choose a sampling of POCs from a few üSpark invariants (Inv_u^4 , Inv_u^6 , Inv_{uprog}^6 , Inv_{uprog}^7 , and Inv_u^{10} ; see Appendix A and [73]) that showcase the importance of all the verification techniques described in §7.1.1. All the üSpark invariant POCs are verified using a combination of these techniques. Note that examples described below are necessary (but not sufficient since they are a sample) for the high-level proofs; for example the NESTEDCALL theorem (§5) cannot be proved if there is no non-overlapping, unity-mapped memory (Inv_u^4) or DMA protection (Inv_u^6).

Figure 4 shows a POC code snippet – from the *vh* üobject page-table setup function within `prime` – for Inv_u^4 verified using deductive verification. ACSL *requires-assign-ensure* clause triples (lines 4–11) are used to specify function behavior. In this case they specify that every memory address in the page tables is disjoint with virtual-to-physical unity mapping. ACSL *loop invariant* clause allows specification of loops with data structure invariants (lines 17–25). Finally, ACSL *ghost variables* – C statements and variables only visible in specifications – are most notably used for modular reasoning of nested function calls. For example, line 28 invokes a support function for obtaining the memory protection of the specified memory address. This is aliased into a ghost variable which can then be used within the specification (line 29). In summary, the *requires-*

```

1 //@ ghost u64 gflags[SZ_PDPT+SZ_PDT+SZ_PT];
2 /*@
3 ...
4 requires \valid(vhpgtblt[0..(SZ_PDPT+SZ_PDT+SZ_PT)-1]);
5 ...
6 assigns vhpgtblt[0..(SZ_PDPT+SZ_PDT+SZ_PT)-1];
7 assigns gflags[0..(SZ_PDPT+SZ_PDT+SZ_PT)-1];
8 ...
9 ensures (\forallall u32 x; 0<=x< SZ_PDPT+SZ_PDT+SZ_PT ==>
10 ((u64)vhpgtblt[x] == ((u64)(x+SZB_4K)
11 & 0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFF000ULL) | (u64)(gflags[x])));
12 @*/
13 void gp_setup_vhmpgtbl(void){
14 u32 i, spatype, slabid=XMHF_SLAB_PRIME;
15 u64 flags;
16 ...
17 /*@
18 loop invariant 0 <= i <= (SZ_PDPT+SZ_PDT+SZ_PT);
19 loop assigns gflags[0..(SZ_PDPT+SZ_PDT+SZ_PT)], spatype,
20 flags,i,vhpgtblt[0..(SZ_PDPT+SZ_PDT+SZ_PT)];
21 loop invariant \forallall integer x; 0 <= x < i ==>
22 ((u64)vhpgtblt[x] == ((u64)(x+SZB_4K)
23 & 0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFF000ULL) | (u64)(gflags[x]));
24 loop variant (SZ_PDPT+SZ_PDT+SZ_PT) - i;
25 @*/
26 for(i=0; i < (SZ_PDPT+SZ_PDT+SZ_PT); ++i){
27 spatype=_gp_getspattype(slabid, (u32)(i+SZB_4K));
28 flags=_gp_getptflags(slabid, (u32)(i+SZB_4K), spatype);
29 //@ ghost gflags[i] = flags;
30 vhpgtblt[i] = pae_make_pte( (i+SZB_4K), flags);
31 }
32 }

```

Fig. 4: Frama-C ACSL behavior specification and deductive verification: *vh* üobject memory page-table setup top-level function in `prime`.

```

prime.c.s:
1 ...
2 ci_movl_eax_medi();
3 ...
hwm-cpu.c:
4 void ci_movl_eax_medi(){
5 ...
6 if(uhm_cpu_r_edi >= IMMULO && uhm_cpu_r_edi >= IMMUHI)
7 uhm_immuwr(uhm_cpu_r_edi, uhm_cpu_r_eax);
8 ...
9 }
hwm-iommu.c:
10 void _gxmhfhwm_iommu_wr(u32 addr, u32 val){
11 ...
12 if (addr==IMMUCTRL){ cbuhm_immuctrlwr(val); ... }
13 ...
14 }
prime-vdrv.c:
15 void cbuhwm_immuctrlwr(u32 val){
16 //@assert !(val & IMMUTE) || (val & IMMUTE) &&
17 // gxmhfhwm_iommu_retaddr == (u32)&gp_ret;
18 }
19 ...

```

Fig. 5: üSpark hardware model and proving IOMMU DMA protection.

assigns-ensures clause triplet is sufficient to represent the function behavior, and the loop invariants and ghost variables within the function are used to prove the clause triplet. ACSL is highly expressive with global and type invariants, including first-order, polymorphic, recursive and higher-order specifications [25].

Fig 5 shows a POC code snippet for Inv_u^6 verified using abstract interpretation and the hardware model. The snippet is part of the DMA protection setup function within `prime`. Line 2 in Fig 5 shows üobject using a designated CASM instruction to perform device I/O to the IOMMU. The hardware model hooks this CASM instruction to the IOMMU device model if the specified I/O range falls within the IOMMU device space (lines 6–7). The IOMMU modeling then simulates the required logic based on the register accessed and value written (line 12). The hardware model also invokes the appro-

Component	Impl	Annot (SLoC)	Verification	
			Time[s]	Mem[GB]
<i>üObject libraries:</i>				
libuc	151	223	101	0.80
libucrypt	88	58	35	0.05
libustub	120	97	5	0.03
libuhw	1706	749	465	0.90
prime	2043	3176	1386	1.10
sentinel	672	501	423	0.75
<i>üXMHF üAPI üObjects:</i>				
ugmpgtbl	128	91	174	0.65
ugcpust	73	46	118	0.70
uhcpust	26	23	99	0.50
<i>üXMHF Core üObjects:</i>				
xcstrt	97	0	53	0.12
xcihub	247	202	147	0.60
xcehub	41	0	48	0.08
<i>üXMHF Hypapp üObjects:</i>				
sysclog	255	213	174	0.75
sysclognw	1193	273	413	0.85
hyperdep	161	31	98	0.70
aprvexec	199	–	–	–
Total/Avg.	7200	5544	3739	0.57
üSpark üAPI composition check			18	0.23
üSpark Hardware model SLoC = 2079				

Fig. 6: üXMHF üobject SLoC and verification time/memory.

appropriate verification driver callbacks whenever such device registers are written to (line 12). This ensures required device state invariants. For example, assertions in lines 16–17 of the IOMMU control register callback ensure that DMA page-table protections when enabled always point to the populated DMA page tables (which are populated by the prime in a separate function not shown). This ensures that devices can only perform DMA to üobject DMA memory region. Similar techniques are used to: (a) hook designated CASM instructions for üobject access to system memory including *ug* üobject memory regions; and (b) proving intra-üobject CFI in the presence of both C and CASM functions by ensuring that CASM functions respect the C ABI and preserve callee registers and stack frames (via corresponding hardware model callbacks, assertions, and ACSL annotations).

POCs for $\text{Inv}_{\text{üprog}}^6$ and $\text{Inv}_{\text{üprog}}^7$ are verified by analysing the abstract syntax trees (AST) to preclude statements involving function pointers in C functions and to ensure CASM functions always end with a CASM `ret` instruction respectively. The POC for $\text{Inv}_{\text{ü}}^{10}$ is verified via CFG analysis to enforce üSpark blueprint conformance. Similar AST-based techniques are employed to: (a) embed hardware model statements, (b) substitute Assembly mnemonics, and (c) ensure soundness of the hardware model by precluding C functions from touching hardware model functions and variables and vice-versa.

8. EVALUATION

8.1. System size and Verification TCB – üXMHF is implemented in 7001 SLoC *verified* privileged code split

übp	ücasM	ücc	ümf	ühwm	ücvf	Total
108	296	138	132	199	148	1021

Fig. 7: Frama-C üSpark specific plugins are written in OCaml and build atop existing Frama-C kernel and standard plugins.

into 11 üobjects with 5544 lines of ACSL annotations and 2079 lines of hardware model (Figure 6). We also implemented an unverified hypervisor extension (**aprvexec**; 199 SLoC) to illustrate how unverified and verified hypervisor üobjects interact. Depending on the properties, üobject verification takes 48 seconds to 23 minutes, and up to 1.1 GB of memory. Cumulative verification time is just over an hour, comparing favorably to related verification efforts [34]. Compositional verification enables each üobject to be (re-)verified separately. The prime üobject takes the longest to verify, but typically does not change as often as other üobjects. Decomposing prime into multiple üobjects can further reduce its (re-)verification time significantly.

Our verification TCB comprises the ACSL annotations, the hardware model (§7.1.2), and Frama-C with associated plugins. Modularity of üobject programs helps keep annotations small and feasible for manual review. Various orthogonal techniques exist to validate our hardware model [50], [58] that we plan to explore as future work. Frama-C is an industrial-strength tool used in many critical systems today [41]; we did not encounter any soundness bugs in these tools (§9). Frama-C üSpark specific plugins (totaling 1021 SLoC of OCaml; Figure 7) are modular, simple, and built upon the existing Frama-C kernel and plugins making them amenable to manual audits. Overall, our TCB compares favorably with other prior approaches (Figure 8).

8.2. Developer Effort – üXMHF was developed and verified in a year by a single system developer who was new to Frama-C/ACSL. A fraction of the time was spent adding implementation support for multiple hypapps with a greater part spent on porting to the üSpark hypervisor architecture by creating required üobjects and adding verification related harnesses and annotations. Annotation-to-code ratio (ACR) ranges from 0.2:1 to 1.6:1 (Figure 6). For üobjects whose properties rely solely on üAPI’s the ACR is small (e.g., **hyperdep**). üObjects with properties requiring functional correctness (e.g., **sysclog** and **xcihub**) have relatively larger ACR. The prime and sentinel üobjects have the highest ACR since they discharge most of the üSpark invariants.

8.3. Performance Measurements – All performance benchmarks were carried out on a Dell Optiplex 9020 with an Intel Core-i5 4590 quad-core processor with 4GB of memory. All üobjects were compiled with full compiler optimizations turned on.

8.3.1. üSpark Microbenchmarks: The cost of a CASM NULL function call is only 12 clock cycles. Sentinel

System/TCB	Compiler	HW Model	Annot./Specs.	Verification Tools	Other
Verve	In TCB	NS	NS	Boogie, BoogieASM, TAL checker, Z3	Iso-gen, boot-loader
seL4	In TCB	NS	In TCB	Isabelle/HOL, HOL4, Myreen, Sonolar, Z3	boot-loader
Hyper-V/Vcc	In TCB	In TCB	In TCB	Vcc, Boogie, Z3	boot-loader
Ironclad	Out-of TCB	In TCB	In TCB	Boogie, BoogieASM, Dafnyspec, Symdiff, Z3	None
mCertiKOS	Out-of TCB	NS	In TCB	Coq	None
üSpark	Out-of TCB	In TCB	In TCB	Frama-C, üSpark plugins, Z3, CVC3, Alt-Ergo	None

Fig. 8: Development and Verification Tools Trusted Computing Base (TCB) Comparison: All systems in addition employ a preprocessor (either built-in or stand-alone) for macro substitution and file inclusion and an assembler and linker to produce machine code; *NS* = *Not supported*

Verified-Verified	Verified-Unverified / Unverified-Verified			
	SEG	CR3	TSK	HVM
2x	37x	48x	70x	278x

Fig. 9: üSpark Microbenchmarks: Sentinel üobject call overheads w.r.t regular NULL function call in privileged mode.

CPUID	RDMSR	WRMSR	XSETBV	CRx	VMCAL	SIPI
100	98	98	100	100	99	99

Fig. 10: üXMHF Microbenchmarks: core intercept handling clock-cycle latency as % of native XMHF performance without üSpark.

sysclog	hyperdep	aprvec	ropdet	iouusb	ionet	iodisk	ioser
97	99	91	89	95	96	99	99

Fig. 11: üXMHF Hypapp and I/O Benchmarks as % of native XMHF performance without üSpark.

SPEC	ioz-read	ioz-write	compbench	apache
100	100	100	100	100

Fig. 12: üXMHF Guest CPU and I/O Benchmarks as % of native XMHF Guest performance without üSpark.

call overhead for verified-to-verified üobject transitions is 2x w.r.t NULL function call (Figure 9). This is due to control transfers to the sentinel and üobject entry points and return addresses via JMP instructions. For transitions involving unverified üobjects the sentinel overhead is broken up into: (a) software overhead such as register saving, parameter marshalling, and call-policy enforcement; and (b) hardware deprivileging overhead. As seen, segmentation and CR3-based page tables provide the lowest overheads (37x and 48x), but are still an order of magnitude larger than the verified-to-verified sentinel call overhead. Hardware deprivileging adds a significant portion (upward of 60%) to the sentinel call in this case. These overheads are comparable to existing unverified disaggregated systems and micro kernels (§10).

8.3.2. üXMHF Microbenchmarks: For purposes of micro benchmarking we measure the üXMHF `xcihub` üobject, which handles several intercepts required for guest execution. üXMHF delivers near native XMHF performance in all cases (Figure 10). We attribute the small overhead for certain intercepts to the code refactoring using üobjects.

8.3.3. üXMHF Guest Benchmarks: We execute both compute-bound and I/O-bound applications for guest benchmarking purposes. For compute-bound applications, we use the SPEC-INT 2006 suite. For

I/O-bound applications, we use the `iozone` (disk reads and writes with 4K block size and 2GB file size), `compilebench` (project compilation benchmark), and Apache web server performance (ab tool with 200,000 transactions with 20 concurrent connections). üXMHF does not affect native XMHF’s guest performance in all cases (Figure 12).

8.3.4. üXMHF Application Benchmarks: We use the hypapps described in §6.1 along with another unverified hypapp `ropdet` (which captures guest branch information for ROP detection) for hypapp performance benchmarking. We wrote a guest üobject that interacts with the hypapps to leverage their services as follows. For `sysclog`, activate syscall logging by setting the syscall code page to no-execute and perform sample syscalls. For `hyperdep`, set a data page to no-execute and perform data read and write operations on that page. For `aprvec`, setup a code page for approved execution, and invoke the hypapp to approve and lock the page against writes, before executing a sort function on that code page. Finally, for `ropdet`, register a test function over which ROP detection is to be performed, and a invoke the test function to collect branch information. Figure 11 shows the performance overhead for these hypapps compared to native XMHF without üSpark. Verified `sysclog` and `hyperdep` run close to native XMHF speeds (2% avg. overhead). Unverified `aprvec` and `ropdet` incur higher overheads (9% and 11% respectively). The overhead is due to üAPI invariant checks (<10%) and the sentinel cost of deprivileging, shadow stack and parameter marshalling (§8.3.1).

For I/O performance benchmarks, we wrote a mix of DMA I/O (usb and net) and programmed I/O operations (disk and serial) within a hypervisor üobject. The I/O performance overhead (Figure 11) is anywhere from 1-5% with the DMA-based I/O incurring more overhead. We attribute the higher DMA-based I/O overhead to the IOMMU page tables for DMA access. Note that üSpark does not actively interpose on any I/O operations, which results in a much lower overhead. These I/O overheads also match up to existing micro hypervisor I/O architecture overheads [67], [72], [86].

9. EXPERIENCE AND LESSONS LEARNED

9.1. Frama-C – The WP plugin’s limited casting support helped detect erroneous esoteric casts, e.g., pointer

to `int/u8`. While the Value plugin cannot propagate states to arbitrarily large loops, the semantic unrolling option helped propagate states only for desired functions so memory/time resources can be well spent. WP loop invariants are versatile in supporting unbounded loops with nesting. WP discharges proofs more effectively when operating over single-dimensional array accesses for mutating assignments and invariants and simple statements using shift and bit-wise operators. WP also caused proof failures in certain cases with local variable aliasing of function parameters; using parameter variables directly ameliorated the issue. We did not encounter any soundness bugs in Frama-C and its plugins.

9.2. Verification Theories – Automated verification results vary by theory, e.g., Alt-Ergo and Z3 failed to discharge a few verification conditions (VC) that CVC3 handled. Frama-C’s ability to combine provers was very useful; CVC3, Z3 and Alt-Ergo together solved all the VCs generated during verification.

9.3. Annotations – ACSL is versatile in its support for writing partial specifications (e.g., memory safety of SHA-1) and assertions as well as complete specifications (e.g., page-table setup). Further, ACSL annotations use actual C variables and operations. This expressivity spectrum thus allows system programmers to easily transition into the verification domain by initially using simple assertions and function contracts (partial specifications) and iteratively mastering complete specifications.

9.4. CompCert – The C99 subset handled by CompCert suffices to implement most systems-level software constructs. However, struct bit fields with packing and alignment within struct fields are currently unsupported. We added methods with bitwise operators to pack, unpack, deconstruct, and align such variables in the sources.

10. RELATED WORK

10.1. Unverified monolithic – SELinux [66], AppArmor [1] and FBAC [59] are some examples of OS kernel modifications that add features to an existing (privileged) kernel to enforce various access control policies. Such approaches suffer from the lack of assurance and separation: a bug in an extension or the core can exist, and then affect other parts of the system arbitrarily.

10.2. Unverified disaggregation – Xen/Xoar [17] converts Xen into deprivileged partitions. NOVA [67] de-privileges everything (including VMM modules), except for a small privileged micro kernel. Safe composition of OS kernel extensions include extensible operating systems [10], [15], [20], [23], [39], [61], kernel driver isolation [13], [28], [47], [48], [69], [70], [78], interposition mechanisms [29], [35], [37], [40] and API compatibility libraries [5], [7], [9], [30], [56], [79]. Xax [19] confines untrusted application code to an ABI for accessing OS services. SGX [4] protects application code from (buggy)

privileged code. Disaggregation brings mere isolation but no formal guarantees on its own.

10.3. Verified sandboxing – SFI [52], [54], [60], [76], [82] is a software-based approach for application-level memory isolation but lacks support for low-level privileged instructions and hardware device access, which are necessary for hypervisor and its extensions. Also, SFI employs unverified binary rewriting which can change the semantics of the program and break invariants necessary for compositional verification. Singularity [36] sacrifices legacy compatibility with a complete redesign of a OS written in type-safe languages (MSIL/TAL) and uses software mechanisms to isolate processes (SIP) and supports only memory and type-safety properties.

10.4. Verified kernels – seL4 [43] verifies full functional correctness of the C implementation (7500 LOC) of the micro kernel by showing that it refines an abstract specification. Their specifications don’t support abstractions among the kernel or the different kernel modules. These interdependencies often lead to more complex invariants which are difficult to prove (20 person years). Further, seL4 does not allow adding properties using untrusted services; such additions require direct integration into the kernel and lengthy re-verification. Furthermore, there is no support for Assembly (ASM) or device states, which precludes verification of low-level code interacting with devices; (1200 C and 500 ASM SLoC remain unverified). mCertiKOS [31] follows a similar approach to seL4 but makes the abstract specification layered to reduce the interdependencies among the kernel and various extensions and makes the verification process more tractable for an admittedly stripped down version of the original CertiKOS kernel (single-core, non-preemptible custom guest OS, basic process and syscall handling). There is no hardware model and support for ASM is limited to only general-purpose registers. Adding extra system instruction support and device models does not seem trivial; even the stripped down version of the kernel has 300 C and 170 ASM SLoC unverified. This is attributed to memory model limitations of their methodology [31]. Lastly, both mCertiKOS and seL4 require the developer to write line-for-line specifications for C/ASM code in a different abstract language (Isabelle/HOL or Coq/Ocaml/Lasm) with a very steep learning curve.

The VCC project [16], [45] verifies the functional correctness of a fixed Hyper-V hypervisor codebase running a multi-CPU guest, via automated theorem proving. However, the code annotations do not support abstractions among the core hypervisor or drivers. This leads to complex invariants due to interdependencies; only 20% of the hypervisor code-base has been verified [16]. Further, their ASM verification methodology and lack of a full hardware model only allows proving memory safety and arithmetic properties for ASM functions while

precluding compiler optimizations for the corresponding C callee functions [51]. XMHF [72] employs the CBMC model checker with assertions on the C code of a micro-hypervisor to verify memory integrity. However, multiple extensions or composing other properties on top of memory integrity are unsupported. Further, that effort *assumes* interface confinement and leaves out 422 C and 388 ASM SLoC due to limitations of CBMC with large-loops and lack of a hardware model.

10.5. Verified System Stack – In Verve [81], a simplified OS and applications are verified for type and memory safety using a Hoare-style verification condition (VC) generator and automated theorem proving. Ironclad [33] extends Verve with support for higher-level application properties. High-level specifications (written in Dafny) are translated to corresponding code with VCs discharged via an automated theorem prover; the verification took 3 person-years. Verisoft [6] integrates hardware and software, with high-level specifications written in C0 (a tiny subset of C semantics) and refined down to a custom CPU semantics. The verification took 20 person-years on a simple OS with only a disk driver. System stack verification approaches, while powerful, sacrifice compositionality, legacy compatibility and performance. Any changes to kernel code and/or extension configuration requires lengthy re-verification (in person years). Further, the entire system software stack has to be re-implemented in type-safe languages such as C# and TAL (in Verve) or in high-level Dafny specifications (in Ironclad) or on a non-commodity CPU abstraction (in Verisoft). Furthermore, these approaches lack support for co-existence with unverified programs or a guest OS.

11. LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE WORK

We now discuss current limitations of our approach with pointers to future work towards bridging these gaps.

11.1. Hardware Model – Our hardware model is currently a trusted component. However, orthogonal techniques such as path-exploration lifting [50] and mechanized x86-multiprocessor semantics [58] provide a solid foundation on which we plan to build upon and validate our hardware model in the future.

11.2. CASM and Certified Compilation – Our high-level proofs depend on CompCert’s specification of the C memory and register semantics and CASM’s adherence to those semantics (discharged as invariants on the source-code and our hardware model) to ensure that the C and Assembly code operate on disjoint state. In the future, we plan on leveraging recent developments with CompCert such as the ability to compile and link multi-module source programs [68] to cleanly extend the bi-simulation proof of the CompCert compiler to encompass hardware state and Assembly code. Future work also involves proving (e.g., via bi-simulation) the

semantic equivalence between the hardware model and the corresponding Assembly instructions and demonstrating the semantic synergy between CompCert, CASM and the Frama-C kernel more rigorously for proved properties to translate to the binary.

11.3. Functional Verification – Our focus in this paper is on security invariants and trace properties and functional correctness to support such properties. We are optimistic that liveness properties and full-functional correctness are achievable future goals and not any more harder than existing approaches [31], [33], [43].

11.4. Concurrency – We have shown that a practical multi-threaded system with interesting security properties can be built by dealing with a serialized execution model and sequential verification in lieu of complex concurrent verification. However, we do realize the importance of relaxing our serialized execution model especially in high-performance computing environments and plan on leveraging source-level multi-threaded verification (e.g., Frama-C mthread plugin [24]) to address concurrency in the future.

11.5. Soundness of Tools – Similar to existing approaches, we assume that the verification tools such as Frama-C with associated plugins and back-end theorem provers such as Z3, CVC3 and Alt-Ergo are sound (§8.1,§3.3). Discharging this assumption, while a desirable goal, is currently an open and hard problem in the face of formal methods. However, seminal breakthroughs such as certified software model-checking [55] and formal verification of C static analyzers [38] give us hope that proving soundness of our verification tools will indeed be possible in the future.

11.6. Applicability – Our future work involves generalizing üSpark to a more broadly applicable framework for building compositionally verifiable systems. We are exploring the applicability of üSpark to general-purpose hypervisors (e.g., Xen and KVM), BIOS, device firmware, operating-system kernel and drivers, user-space applications and browser extensions including vertical integration among these stacked subsystems. The immediate challenges we envision there include unraveling complex data structures, supporting dynamic memory allocations and use of indirect function calls in addition to supporting some form of concurrency.

12. CONCLUSION

We presented überSpark, an innovative architecture enforcing verifiable object abstractions in low-level C and Assembly languages and leveraging them in combination with off-the-shelf C software verifiers and certifying compilers to produce high assurance hypervisors for commodity platforms. We incrementally developed and verified a commodity x86 micro-hypervisor using üSpark, and performed a comprehensive evaluation which

shows automated compositional verification with modest development effort and minimal runtime overhead.

Availability: ÜBERSPARK and ÜXMHF sources are available at: <http://uberspark.org>

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APPENDIX A ÜSPARK INVARIANTS

üSpark reasoning relies foundationally on a set of invariants – properties that must hold throughout the execution of a üSpark hypervisor. The invariants are divided into üSpark system invariants (Figure 13) and üSpark general programming invariants (those that pertain specifically to üSpark üobject C and CASM functions; Figure 14). Each invariant is proved by reducing it further to a set of *proof-assumptions on hardware* (PAHs) and *proof-obligations on code* (POCs) using the üSpark blueprint (üBP; §4–Figure 2). POCs are then discharged on all üSpark verified üobjects including the prime and sentinel using specific verification tools and techniques (§7). A hypervisor implementation is compliant with üSpark– and therefore amenable to compositional reasoning – if it satisfies all the üSpark invariants. Full details including a formal model of the üSpark architecture, semantics, verification approach, associated theorem proofs and invariant-to-PAH/POC mappings can be found in our technical report [73].

- Inv_ü¹ üSpark begins execution with the entry point of a distinguished initial “prime” üobject s_I in single-core mode with just core 1 activated
- Inv_ü² A special “asynchronous” function $startcores(s)$ activates all cores $i > 1$ and begins executing a designated üobject s immediately thereafter; all cores remain active thereafter for the system lifetime.
- Inv_ü³ Asynchronous control transfers (hardware interrupts, exceptions and intercepts) respect the blueprint state execution threading and transitions
- Inv_ü⁴ üObject memory regions are unity-mapped and non-overlapping
- Inv_ü⁵ üObject s accesses only its own memory
- Inv_ü⁶ üObject code, data and stack regions are DMA protected
- Inv_ü⁷ üObject code is write-protected
- Inv_ü⁸ Inter-üobject synchronous control-flow respect blueprint transitions
- Inv_ü⁹ Each core has its own stack at all times and stays within the stack limits.
- Inv_ü¹⁰ Blueprint state has state appropriate execution threading (multi-core or single-core)
- Inv_ü¹¹ Locks behave like “memory fences”; any write preceding a call to unlock is observed by any read following the next call to lock

Fig. 13: üSpark System Invariants

- Inv_{üprog}¹ CASM functions preserve caller registers
- Inv_{üprog}² CASM functions establish local stack frame non-overlapping with incoming caller stack frame
- Inv_{üprog}³ CASM functions have conditional and unconditional branches local to the function
- Inv_{üprog}⁴ CASM functions establish callee incoming stack frame for calls to other C or CASM functions
- Inv_{üprog}⁵ CASM functions tear down local stack frame before returning
- Inv_{üprog}⁶ CASM functions end with return instruction
- Inv_{üprog}⁷ No function pointers in C functions
- Inv_{üprog}⁸ C and CASM functions do not write to caller stack frame params and return-address
- Inv_{üprog}⁹ CASM functions can only encode instructions within the domain of CASM instruction set
- Inv_{üprog}¹⁰ CASM non-local control transfer instructions can only be to fixed function entry points

Fig. 14: üSpark Programming Invariants

APPENDIX B

VERIFICATION OF ÜXMHF ÜOBJECTS LOCAL INVARIANT PROPERTIES

We now describe our verification approach in detail for verifying the invariant properties of the üXMHF üobjects shown in Figure 15. For all the üobjects we verify via deductive verification that the üobject entry point function transfers control to the appropriate method handler for a given public method.

We verify the üAPI üobjects via abstract interpretation. For the `uhcpust` üobject we verify that the `write` method, in case of a write to MSR EFER, always preserves the EFER bits required for üSpark functionality.

üObject	Type	Invariant Property
<code>xcihub</code>	<i>vh</i>	On intercept invoke corresponding hypapp handler
<code>ugcpust</code>	<i>vh</i>	Writes to host state only by prime or sentinel
<code>uhcpust</code>	<i>vh</i>	No writes to host MSR EFER
<code>ugmpgtbl</code>	<i>vh</i>	No mapping of hypervisor memory regions
<code>hyperdep</code>	<i>vh</i>	Guest OS provided memory-pages are marked read-write and not executable
<code>sysclog</code>	<i>vh</i>	On system call trap intercept, log syscall information to network log buffer
<code>sysclognw</code>	<i>vh</i>	Log info in network log buffer and transmit buffer when full
<code>aprvec</code>	<i>uh</i>	Guest OS approved code pages are always marked read-only and executable

Fig. 15: üXMHF Core, üAPI and Hypapp üobject invariants; *vh* = verified hypervisor üobject, *uh* = unverified hypervisor üobject

For the `ugmpgtbl` üobject we verify that the `setentry` method’s entry parameter does not fall within hypervisor memory regions. Finally, for the `ugcpust` üobject we verify that the `write` method disallows writes to any host-specific state in the guest VMCS.

For the `xcihub` üobject we employ deductive verification to verify the `main` method such that, for any given intercept a special function `hcbinvoke` is called with the intercept type and associated parameters. `hcbinvoke` is then verified to ensure that it calls all the registered hypapp üobjects for that intercept.

For the `sysclog` üobject we employ deductive verification to first verify that the `init` method invokes the `ugmpgtbl` üobject `setentry` method with the syscall page address with read and no-execute protections. We then verify that the syscall trap handler obtains syscall information via a call to the `ugcpust` üobject `read` method and stores this information to the network log buffer via a call to the `sysclognw` üobject `log` method.

We verify the `sysclognw` üobject via deductive verification and abstract interpretation. We use deductive verification to verify the `log` method to ensure that: (a) the buffer passed in as parameters is stored in the network buffer data structure, and (b) when the buffer is full, its contents are copied into the üobject `dadata` region, buffer is reset, and the network send function is invoked. We then verify the `send` function via abstract interpretation to ensure that it programs the network card hardware to read from the `dadata` region, transmit the buffer, and wait for end of transmission signal.

We use deductive verification to verify the `hyperdep` üobject `activate` method to ensure that the guest page address that is passed is used as the parameter to the `ugmpgtbl` üobject `setentry` method with read, write and no-execute protections.

Note, `aprvec` (unverified) üobject is not verified since its properties follow from the `ugmpgtbl` üAPI invariants ensured by our composition check as described in §7.2.1.